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RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND
PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
William P. Alston

The existence of a plurality of religious communities, each with its own belief system that is incompatible in various respects with each of the others, poses a serious
and well advertised problem for the claims of each community. After all, it looks as
if Moslems, Hindus, and Buddhists have grounds of the same general sort (revelation, religious experience, miracles, authority, etc.) as my fellow Christians and I
have for the truth of our respective systems of doctrine. But then, unless I have sufficient reason for supposing that Christians are in a superior position for discerning
the truth about these matters, why should I suppose that we are right and they are
wrong? How can I be justified in continuing to affirm my Christian beliefs?
Note that this is hardly a crucial epistemological problem unless there are substantial grounds of belief within each community. If Christian beliefs are without
any significant internal justification, then they lack positive epistemic status quite
apart from competition from other religions, and so for the others.' I have no time
in this essay to argue that this condition holds for the major religions of the world.
I shall simply assume that it does, so as to throw the distinctive difficulties posed
by religious pluralism into sharp relief.
One response to this problem is to argue that, despite appearances, there are no
incompatibilities, or no fundamental incompatibilities, between the major world
religions, thereby removing another fundamental condition of the problem. This
line can take different forms. (1) The strongest would be the contention that the
existent doctrinal systems, as generally understood, are not incompatible. To
show this would be a brilliant feat indeed. (2) A more modest and feasible-seeming
project would be to try to trim each system of various "excesses" so that what is
left in each case is compatible with what is left in the others. (3) We might follow
John Hick and others in introducing a level distinction, contending that though the
various belief systems conflict with each other that is because they constitute different "pictures", "images", or "representations" of the one ultimate reality, which is
represented in each adequately enough for practical (salvific) purposes butthe real
nature of which is adequately captured in none of them. And there are other variants.
However, for purposes of this paper I am going to take none of these enterprises
to succeed in eliminating at least a stubborn residue of incompatibilities.
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The most obvious move, in the face of genuine incompatibilities, is to try to
show that the beliefs of one's own religion are true and those of the competition
are false. If this maximally direct approach is to have any chance of success it
must proceed on the basis of considerations that are common to all parties, like
sense perception, rational self-evidence, and common modes of reasoning. For
if the Christian tries to show that her beliefs are true, and that Hindu beliefs are
false, by appealing to God's self revelation in the Bible, we are, if would seem,
no further forward. Now I do not want to assert that it is impossible to show by
general metaphysical and empirical arguments that the system of Christian belief
is superior to its rivals; nor do I want to assert the contrary. Again I shall simply
set that enterprise aside and consider the epistemic situation on the assumption
that it cannot succeed.
A less direct solution would be to argue, on the basis of common grounds,
that the Christian is in a better epistemic position to get the truth about these
matters than the adherents of other religions. I have no idea how this would go,
and so I shall ignore this maneuver.
My discussion presupposes a realist theory of truth and its applicability to
religious belief. I assume that religious beliefs are true or false according to
whether what is believed is the case, whether or not we have any way of deciding
this. Philosophers sometimes avoid the whole problem of religious pluralism
just by eschewing a realist theory of truth, at least in application to religious
belief. If the truth of religious belief simply means something like 'passes the
standard tests of that "form of life", "language game", or whatever', then the
beliefs of all the major world religions could be equally true. I refrain from
taking this easy way out.
The form our problem takes for my own work on the epistemology of religious
belief is determined by the major thesis I have been concerned to defend.
P. The experience (or, as I prefer to say, the "perception") of God
provides prima facie epistemic justification for beliefs about what
God is doing or how God is "situated" vis-a-vis one at the moment
("M-beliefs", 'M' for 'manifestation').
Examples of M-beliefs would be the belief that God is sustaining one in being,
pouring out His love into one, communicating a certain message to one, or
simply presenting Himself to one as supremely good or powerful. The experiences
I take to constitute (putative) perceptions of God range over any cases in which
the subject takes herself to be aware of God as presenting Himself to her experience. This includes, but is not restricted to, "mystical" experiences of the classic
type in which one seems, momentarily, to lose one's identity in merging with
the divine. It also includes dim background experiences of the presence of God
as well as more vivid and shorter lasting focal experiences. And it ranges over

435

RELIGIOUS DNERSITY

both experiences that are and those that are not mediated by sense perception of
the physical and social environment. I take it that perception of God, thus broadly
construed, is a widespread phenomenon among religious folk.
To explain how religious pluralism poses a problem for this thesis 1 will first
have to layout the general epistemological framework in which the thesis is set.
ii
We engage in a plurality of more or less distinct "doxastic practices", i.e.,
practices of belief formation, each of which involves distinctive sorts of input
to "belief-forming mechanisms" and distinctive "input-output functions" that
yield beliefs related in particular ways to the outputs. 2 Thus, to take the easiest
case to describe, a deductive inference practice will feature a variety of
mechanisms that take beliefs as inputs, each mechanism operating according to
a function defined by some form of reasoning. (Unfortunately these are not
restricted to valid inference forms.) The sense perceptual practice involves functions that are harder to describe, each of which goes from some characteristic
pattern of sensory experience to a belief about the physical environment. Other
familiar examples of doxastic practices involve the formation of beliefs on the
basis of memory, introspection, and non-deductive reasoning of various sorts.
Built into each practice is also a set of checks and tests for the beliefs so formed,
in other terms, a series of possible "overriders" for the prima facie justification
conferred on a belief by its emergence from that practice. For the sense perceptual
practice (hereinafter 'SP'), e.g., a particular perceptual belief may be overridden
by sufficient independent reasons to think the belief false (I seemed to see an
elephant, but there couldn't have been one there), or sufficient reasons to suppose
that one's perceptual faculties were not working properly. A doxastic practice
will typically operate on certain basic assumptions that cannot be justified within
the practice but rather serve as presuppositions of any exercise thereof. Thus SP
presupposes the independent (of experience) existence of physical objects and
the by and large reliability of sense perception. In some cases a practice will
also deal with a distinctive subject matter and will feature a distinctive conceptual
scheme. This is true, e.g., of SP, but not of the inferential practices. Finally, a
doxastic practice is typically acquired and engaged in well before one is explicitly
aware of it. When one arrives at the age of reflection one finds oneself with a
mastery of many such practices and ineluctably involved in their exercise. And
whatever role innate mechanisms play in the matter, such practices are socially
established by socially monitored learning and are socially shared. 3
I don't want to give the impression that different doxastic practices (hereinafter
'DP') operate in isolation from each other. On the contrary, they depend on each
other in various ways. Inferential practices obviously depend on others for their
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(ultimate) belief inputs. And the overrider system connected with, e. g., SP,
makes use of a general picture of the physical world built up by applying memory
and reasoning to the output of SP.
How are DP's to be assessed, epistemically? My answer is based on the point
that our belief forming activity essentially aims at maximizing truth and
minimizing falsehood. Therefore our basic term of positive epistemic evaluation,
'justification', 'rationality', or whatever, should be truth-linked, should be such
that a positive rating carries with it at least a strong probability of truth. That
is, I am justified in believing that p only if the belief is formed in such a way
that it is thereby likely to be true. Hence, getting back to DP's, a practice will
yield mostly justified beliefs only if it is reliable, only if it is such that the
input-output mechanisms it involves are, by and large, reliable ones.' But then
the most fundamental epistemological question to ask of a DP is as to whether
it is reliable.
But how do we determine whether a DP is reliable? The most direct approach
would be to compare its output beliefs with the facts that make them true or false,
and determine the track record of the practice in a suitable spread of cases. Sometimes this is possible. It is possible, e.g., when we are dealing with what we might
call "partial" or "restricted" practices, like determining temperature on the basis
of mercury thermometers, or recognizing vintages of wine by taste. In these cases
we have other modes of access to the facts in question, modes which we can use to
check the accuracy of the practice under examination. But we fairly quickly arrive
at more inclusive practices where this technique is no longer available. If we are
assessing SP in general, e. g. , we have no independent access to the facts in question
(facts concerning the physical environment of the perceiver), i.e., no access that
neither consists in nor is based on reliance on sense perception; and so we have no
non-circular check on the accuracy of the deliverances of SP. We might try a more
indirect approach, e.g., arguing "pragmatically" that the success in predicting and
controlling nature we have achieved by basing our activities on sense perception
indicates that SP is a reliable guide to the environment. But this exhibits circularity
in a more subtle form. How do we tell that we have been successful in prediction?
By making observations to determine whether what was predicted actually happened. We aren't informed of this by an angel. Thus it appears that when we try to
assess the reliability of the likes of SP, we are unable to find any otherwise cogent
argument for reliability that does not involve a reliance on the very practice under
scrutiny. And the same holds, I make bold to say, for memory, introspection, and
deductive and inductive reasoning. Let's call any socially established DP for
which this is true "basic".
What, then, is the most rational attitude to take toward basic DP's? When we
eschew circular arguments none of them can be shown to be reliable, and if such
arguments are admitted a demonstration of reliability is, of course, quickly forth-
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coming in each case. If we use the outputs of a DP to check the accuracy of that DP
it can easily score 100%; we simply use each output twice, once as testee and once
as tester. In this respect all DP's are on a par. Insofar as reliability is the crucial
consideration, and pending the possibility of a demonstration of unreliability, it
would seem that we are confined to either taking all of them to be acceptable (i.e.,
regarding them as reliable) or taking all of them to be unacceptable. It would be
arbitrary to distinguish between them. Clearly, abstention from all such practices
is not a live option; therefore the only rational alternative open to us is to accord
prima facie acceptance to all basic socially established practices (regard them as
prima facie reliable), pending a demonstration of unreliability, or the invocation of
any other disqualifying consideration.
Just a word as to how a basic practice might be shown unreliable. First, there is
the possibility of a massive and persistent inconsistency in its output (not just the
sporadic inconsistency that pops up from time to time in the best behaved DP's).
Second, there is inconsistency between its outputs and the outputs of more firmly
established DP's. To be sure, even if a DP runs into trouble in one or more of these
respects it may well be modified so as to get back in line without losing its distinctive character. I take it that this has repeatedly happened with religious DP's.
We should also note that there is a kind of "self-support" by which a basic
DP can strengthen its claim to rational acceptance. This is illustrated by the
predictive success we attain on the basis of SP and associated practices (call the
whole complex the "empirical DP"). This is not a non-circular support, for, as
we have seen, we have to use the practice to ascertain that the success was
forthcoming. Nevertheless it is far from trivial, since it is quite conceivable that
the practice should not display it, and, in fact, many empirical DP's, e.g., the
reading of tea leaves, do not exhibit anything analogous, even on their own
showing. From now on I shall take it that the secular DP's I have been discussing
are all basic, free from massive intra- or inter-inconsistency, and significantly
self-supporting. Even after it has passed all these tests a practice is still only
prima facie rationally acceptable, since there is always the possibility that trouble
may develop in the future, particularly in the way of inconsistency with more
firmly established practices. But a practice that satisfies all the conditions
specified is in a very strong epistemic position indeed.
Now consider the practice of forming M-beliefs about God on the basis of
experiences one takes to be direct experiential presentations of God: e.g., forming
the belief that God is pouring out His love into one on the basis of what one
takes to be an experience of God's doing just that. I want to suggest that this
too is a basic DP, or rather, as we shall shortly see, more than one such DP.
The phenomenology of religious experience indicates that we have distinctive
sorts of experiential inputs here, especially where the experiences in question
are non-sensory. And with this come distinctive input-output functions for going
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from a certain kind of experience to a correlated belief content. Finally, there
are distinctive checks and tests to be used in the assessment of particular M-beliefs.
It is at this point that we are forced to recognize that, unlike the SP situation,
there is not one unique DP of forming M-beliefs about God, much less one
unique DP of forming M-beliefs about Ultimate Reality. For the overrider system
will vary from one religious tradition to another. It will be heavily based on the
canonical scriptures of a tradition, together with whatever other sources there
are for its general picture of the Ultimate and our relations thereto. For the major
constraint on particular M-beliefs is that they do not conflict with that authoritative
picture of the situation. Other tests too will vary from one tradition to another,
e.g., whether the M-believer exhibits in his/her life the marks of genuine communion with the Ultimate; for these marks will vary somewhat from one tradition
to another. The present point is that if we consider a particular religious community we will find an overrider system of the sort just indicated. For present
purposes let's construe 'religious community' fairly broadly so as to embrace
many differences. on points of detail. In that spirit we can identify what I shall
call a "mainline Christian community" that relies on the picture of God and His
relations to mankind derived from the Bible and from church tradition, allowing,
of course, for changes in the understanding of these through time, and allowing
for differences of emphasis and of detail. Let's use the acronym 'CP' for the
practice of forming M-beliefs within the Christian community, subject to the
Christian overrider system. 5
I am going to assume for purposes of this paper that CP is a basic practice,
that it is impossible to establish its reliability in a non-circular way. 6 Since it is
a socially established basic practice it will count, by the general epistemological
principles I have enunciated, as prima facie acceptable, i.e., as prima facie
reliable. I will also assume that we have, if necessary, purified the practice, and
the system of Christian beliefs it embodies, so that it exhibits no massive and
persistent inconsistencies, either internally or vis-a-vis other more firmly established practices. Finally, I will take it that it exhibits an appropriate kind of
self-support. This will be quite different from the self-support that attaches to
SP, just because the character of the practices are so different. Whereas SP is
significantly self-supported by its success (as judged internally) in prediction
and control, CP, to which those aims are foreign, is significantly self-supported
by the fact that the promises held out to its devotees in the way of spiritual
development can be seen (from within) to be fulfilled significantly often. As a
result of all this CP makes a strong prima facie claim to reliability and hence to
rational acceptance. 7
T. CP is prima facie reliable, and hence prima facie rationally acceptable.
I have in previous writings examined a number of objections to this thesis,
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e.g., that there are no objective intersubjective tests of particular M-beliefs, that
the experience involved can be adequately explained in tenn of natural factors,
and that many people claim to have no such perceptions. I have argued that all
these objections, and others as well, are based either on epistemic chauvinism
(arbitrarily using the standards of one DP to judge another) or on arbitrarily
holding different practices subject to different requirements (the double standard). 8
However there is one difficulty I have not been able to deal with in these
ways and that is the one posed by the diversity of religions. To bring religious
diversity to bear on my thesis T, I will further stipUlate that, in addition to CP,
there are other experiential DP's in other religious traditions that are basic practices, not discredited by internal or external inconsistencies and enjoying the
same degree of self-support. 9 Thus CP is confronted with DP's that yield outputs
incompatible (on the whole) with its own, each of which has the same sort of
claim to rational acceptance and none of which are discredited by any neutral
standards. All this being the case, how can it be deemed rational for me to fonn
M-beliefs in accordance with CP rather than in accordance with one of the rival
religious DP's?
It might appear that the problem posed by religious pluralism for my thesis
is much more restricted than the problem posed for total systems of religious
belief. For M-beliefs constitute only one segment of the beliefs of a religion,
and not the most prominent at that. However important they may be for the
individual believer, their importance for the community as a whole lies in the
empirical support they provide for the system, rather than in being themselves
components of the basic faith of that community. It is no part of the common
faith of the church that God sustained me in being yesterday. Nevertheless, in
attempting to deal with the problem as it impinges on the empirical support of
M-beliefs we will be led into the larger problem. First, M-beliefs make use of
the basic conceptual and doctrinal scheme of the religion. In supposing that I
have been directly aware of God communicating a certain message to me, I
suppose that it is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, creator of heaven and
earth, Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, that is communicating that message to
me. I do not learn from that experience that the source of the message is the
creator of heaven and earth, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, etc., but it is
part of what I take to be true in fonning the M-belief.1O And hence the complete
M-belief cannot be prima facie justified for me, unless I am prima facie justified
in that identification of the communicator. Second, as we have seen, the idea
that a particular experience provides prima facie justification for a particular
M-belief presupposes an overrider system that involves the general picture of
God (the Ultimate) and our relations thereto that has been built up in the community over the centuries. But this means that in defending, or assessing, the general
practice of basing M-beliefs on experience, we have to defend or assess the
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general system of belief in the community. Hence it is impossible to isolate the
epistemology of M-beliefs from the epistemology of that wider system. And so
anything that threatens the epistemic status of the latter will ipso facto threaten
the epistemic status of the former. II
iii
Against this background let us try to be as explicit as possible as to the
difficulty the fact of religious pluralism is alleged to pose for my thesis T. Just
how is the fact of conflicting religious doxastic practices supposed to make it
irrational for me to regard CP as a source of epistemic justification for M-beliefs?
Given what I have been saying, religious pluralism would have such a bearing
only if it constitutes a reason for thinking CP to be unreliable. And why should
we suppose that it does? In considering possible answers to this question I shall
move from the less to the more weighty reasons.
First, religious pluralism shows that practitioners of CP cannot appeal to a
general consensus, even among those who take themselves to experience Ultimate
Reality. All normal adults engage in pretty much the same doxastic practice of
forming perceptual beliefs about the physical environment, but the ways of
finding out about the Ultimate on the basis of experience differ sharply among
the world religions. Therefore, with sense perception we will get general agreement both on particular perceptual beliefs and on the reliability of a particular
doxastic practice, while no such consensus exists for CP.
This difference obviously holds, but it is not so clear what its bearing is on
the case at hand. Why suppose that it has any tendency to show that CP is
unreliable. As pointed out earlier, CP has a claim to reliability just by virtue of
the fact that it is a "going concern." Even though that claim cannot be strengthened
in one of the ways the claim of SP is strengthened, we cannot conclude that it
is unreliable. We could draw that conclusion only if we had reason to think that
if it were reliable it would be used world wide. But why should we suppose that
every reliable doxastic practice will be universally shared? I see no reason to
assume this; it is a mere prejudice, based on the overwhelming prominence that
universally shared practices have in our lives.
A more serious line of argument is this. The best explanation of religious
pluralism will leave the claims of CP, or any other religious DP, discredited.
We can distinguish a more and a less strong form of this argument. The stronger
form takes a hard naturalist line and contends that the best explanation of the
facts of religious diversity is that there is no objective reality with which any of
the contenders are in cognitive contact. For if there were, there would not be
such persistent disagreements as to what it is like and how we are related to it.
But this is only a rehash of the contention we have just dismissed, to the effect
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that any genuine cognitive contact with an objective reality would be shared
across all cultural boundaries. There is no (sufficient) reason to suppose that
religious diversity is best explained by an internal, non-veridical origin of all
the experiences on which the beliefs are fonned. The facts are at least as well
explained by the hypothesis that there is a transcendent reality, or dimension of
reality, with which some or all of these practices are in touch, though of course
they cannot all have it exactly straight. 12
A more modest argument would be that the diversity is best explained by
supposing that none of the competing practices is reliable. For if one of the
practices were reliable, that would show itself to us in such a way as to distinguish
it from the rest. But no such distinguishing marks are evident. Therefore the
best explanation of the diversity is that they all miss the mark to such a degree
that none of them can be considered sufficiently reliable for rational acceptance.
But why should we suppose that any reliable doxastic practice will bear external
marks of its reliability for all, participants and non-participants alike, to see.
That is not the case for familiar, universal, non-controversial practices like SP.
SP's marks of reliability are displayed, as we have seen, only from within the
practice. Why should we suppose it to be otherwise with respect to religious,
non-universal practices? Why suppose that if CP is a by and large reliable
cognitive access to certain aspects of God, that reliability could be ascertained
from other practices, when that is not the case with SP? And from within CP,
just as from within SP, there are abundant indications of reliability. For example,
God is experienced within CP as telling us that He will be present to us.
iv
What's happening here? Is religious pluralism merely a paper tiger? Surely
there is something to the idea that I have less reason to trust the reliability of
CP than I would have if it were not for religious diversity? What about the idea
presented at the outset, that since the participant of one religious OP has no
non-question begging reason to suppose herself in a superior epistemic position
to her competitors, she is not justified in supposing that it is her OP that is the
reliable one? Well, I think there is something to that idea, and I will now try to
bring out just what there is to it and what there isn't.
Let's begin by spelling out the idea more fully. "We have premised that only
one religious doxastic practice can be (sufficiently) reliable. But why should I
suppose CP to be that one? I would need some reason for supposing that it puts
me in a superior epistemic position for getting the truth about God. But I have
no such reason. That is, I have no such reason that proceeds from ground common
to all the contenders. Within CP I have such reason; CP "tells" me that God has
revealed Himself to mankind in the Old and New Testament and in the Christian
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church. But the adherents of other religions have analogous reasons within their
traditions for their epistemic superiority. And why should I suppose that my
internal reasons are more likely to be correct than their internal reasons? The
same difficulty again. Unless I have some external reason to suppose that my
practice provides a more reliable cognitive access to the Ultimate than the others,
I am being arbitrary in picking mine as the one that is sufficiently reliable for
rational acceptance".
Note that there is no claim here to show that CP is unreliable, but only a claim
to undermine the antecedent reasons for supposing it to be reliable. Religious
diversity is a reason for doubting the reliability of any particular religious doxastic
practice. Given religious pluralism, we lack sufficient reason for affirming the
reliability of CP or any other particular religious DP.
In assessing the force of this argument it will be useful to focus on analogies
that readily spring to mind, e.g., cases in which the witnesses to an automobile
accident give divergent accounts of what happened. Unless a given witness, H,
has sufficient reasons for regarding herself as in a better position to make accurate
observations of the accident, the fact that she is confronted by several accounts
that diverge from hers should reduce her confidence in her own. These disparities
reduce, or nullify, her justification for believing that the accident was as she
takes it to be.
However, there are two important differences between this kind of case and
religious diversity. First, the former has to do with the epistemic status of
particular beliefs, while the latter has to do with the status of entire DP's. We
could find a closer analogue in this respect by switching to competitions between
methods.13 Consider ways of predicting the weather: various "scientific"
meteorological approaches, going by the state of rheumatism in one's joints,
and observing groundhogs. Again, if one employs one of these methods but has
no non-question begging reason for supposing that method to be more reliable
than the others, then one has no sufficient rational basis for reposing confidence
in its outputs.
But whether the examples concern particular beliefs or belief forming procedures, there is still a crucial difference between these cases, where it is clear
that uneliminated alternatives reduce or eliminate one's basis for one's own belief
or practice, and the religious situation. That difference can be stated very simply.
In the clear cases the competitors confront each other within the same DP, and
hence it is clear what would constitute non-circular grounds for supposing one
of the contestants to be superior to the others, even if we do not have such
grounds. We know the sorts of factors that would disqualify an observer of the
accident (inattention, emotional involvement, visual defects, a poor angle of
observation), and we know what would decisively show that one account is the
correct one (e.g., agreement with a number of new witnesses). In the weather
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prediction case it is, in principle, a simple matter to run a statistical test on the
predictive success of the various methods and choose between them on that
basis. It is just because of this that in the absence of sufficient reasons for
supposing himself to be in a superior position, one the contestants, H, is not
justified in continuing to be strongly confident of his alternative. It is because
the absence of such reasons (for one's superiority to one's rivals) is the absence
of something there is a live possibility of one's having, and that one knows how
to go about getting, that this lack so clearly has strongly negative epistemic
consequences. But precisely this condition is lacking in the religious diversity
case. Since, as we are assuming, each of the major world religions involves (at
least one) distinct DP, with its own way of going from experiential input to
beliefs formulated in terms of that scheme, and its own system of overriders,
the competitors lack the kind of common procedure for settling disputes that is
available to the participants in a shared DP. Here, in contrast to the intra-DP
cases, my adversary and I do not lack something that we know perfectly well
how to go about getting. Hence the sting is taken out of the inability of each of
us to show that he is in an epistemically superior position. And so this lack does
not have the epistemically deleterious consequences found in the intra-DP cases.
Or, at the very least, it is not clear that it has those consequences. To put the
point most sharply, we have no idea what a non-circular proof of the reliability
of CP would look like, even if it is as reliable as you please. Hence why should
we take the absence of such a proof to nullify, or even sharply diminish, the
justification I have for my Christian M-beliefs?
This conclusion, that the lack of a common ground alters drastically the
epistemic bearings of an unresolved incompatibility, can be illustrated by secular
examples. Consider the methodological opposition between psychoanalysts and
behaviorists concerning the diagnosis and treatment of neurosis and, more generally, concerning human motivation. Psychoanalytic formulations are heavily
based on clinical "insight" and "interpretation". Behaviorists typically reject
these as data and restrict themselves to "harder" data, the observation of which
can be easily replicated under controlled conditions. Since psychoanalysts do
not reject the legitimacy of the behavioral data, but only hold that they are
insufficient for dealing with the problems with which they are concerned, the
issue is over the status of the analysts' "data". Let's say that there is no common
ground on which the dispute can be resolved. 14 Here we are not so ready, or
should not be so ready, to judge that it is irrational for the psychoanalyst to
continue to form clinical beliefs in the way he does without having non-circular
reasons for supposing that his method of forming clinical diagnoses is a reliable
one. Since we are at a loss to specify what such non-circular reasons would look
like even if the method is reliable, we should not regard the practitioner as
irrational for lacking such reasons.
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Let's now consider a counter-factual analogue. Suppose that there were a
diversity of sense perceptual DP's as diverse as religious experiential DP's are
in fact. Suppose that in certain cultures there were a well established "Cartesian"
practice of construing what is visually perceived as an indefinitely extended
medium that is more or less concentrated at various points, rather than, as in
our" Aristotelian" practice, as made up of more or less discrete objects of various
kinds scattered about in space. Let's also suppose that in other cultures a
"Whiteheadian" SP is equally socially established; here the visual field is construed as made up of momentary events growing out of each other in a continuous
process. IS Let's further suppose that each of these practices serves its practitioners
equally well in their dealings with the environment. We may even suppose that
each group has developed physical science, in its own terms, to about as high
a pitch as the others. But suppose further that we are as firmly wedded to our
"Aristotelian" mode of conceptualizing what is visually perceived, as we are in
fact. The Cartesian and Whiteheadian auslander seem utterly outlandish to us,
and we find it difficult to take seriously the idea that they may be telling it like
it is. However we can find no neutral grounds on which to argue effectively for
the greater accuracy of our way of doing it. In such a situation would it be clear
that it is irrational for us to continue to form perceptual beliefs in our "Aristotelian"
way, given that the practice is proving itself by its fruits? It seems to me that
quite the opposite is clear. In the absence of any external reason for supposing
that one of the competing practices is more accurate than my own, the only
rational course for me to take is to sit tight with the practice of which I am a
master and which serves me so well in guiding my activity in the world. But
our actual situation with regard to CP is precisely parallel to the one we have
been imagining. Hence, by parity of reasoning, the rational thing for a practitioner
of CP to do is to continue to form Christian M-beliefs, and, more generally, to
continue to accept, and operate in accordance with, the system of Christian belief.
I have been suggesting that if there actually were a diversity of sense perceptual
practices, we would be faced with an epistemological problem with respect to
SP exactly parallel to that we actually face with respect to CPo But why shouldn't
we say that the mere possibility of an SP diversity implies that the problem
already arises. If it is so much as possible that human beings should construe
what is presented in visual perception in a radically different way, and so much
as possible that the practice so constituted should be as internally viable as our
actual SP, then doesn't that possibility raise the question of why we should
suppose that it is rational to form beliefs in the SP way, given that we have no
reason to suppose it to be more reliable than these other possibilities? And if in
that case it is rational to engage in SP, despite the lack of any non-circular reason
for regarding our Aristotelian SP as more reliable than its possible alternatives,
that conclusion should carry over to the CP problem.
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And yet it is difficult to work ourselves up into worrying about these possibilities, and even difficult to convince ourselves that it is our intellectual duty
to do so. Insofar as this has a respectable basis, it is that it is not really clear
that the alleged possibilities are indeed possible. At least they may well not be
real possibilities for us, given our actual constitution and the lawful structure of
the world. It may be that we are innately programmed to perceive the environment
in Aristotelian terms, and that this program does not allow for social reprogramming into a "Cartesian" or a "Whiteheadian" mode. Nevertheless, I want to
reiterate that if these alternatives really are possible, then they give rise to
difficulties for the rationality of engaging in SP that are quite parallel to those
arising from the actual diversity of religions for the rationality of engaging in
CP. And so, in that case, if it is rational to engage in SP despite these difficulties,
the same conclusion follows for CP.
Although I have been speaking in the first person for the most part, it goes
without saying, I hope, that the conclusions I have been drawing concerning my
epistemic situation as a practitioner of CP hold, pari passu, for practitioners of
the other internally validated religious DP's. In each case the person who is in
the kind of position 1 have been describing will be able to justifiably engage in
his/her own religious DP despite not being able to show that it is epistemically
superior to the competition. It may seem strange that such incompatible positions
could be justified for different people, but this is just a special case of the general
point that incompatible propositions can each be justified for different people if
what they have to go on is suitably different.
v

I have been arguing that despite appearances, religious pluralism does not
show any irrationality in the use of CP, and, by parity of argument, in the use
of any other such religious experiential DP. But does that imply that it in no
way constitutes a problem for the Christian, Moslem, or Buddhist? By no means.
In conclusion I will enumerate some of the problems that remain.
I will begin with the non-epistemic ones. First, there is, from within any
particular religion, a theological problem. In a theistic religion this will take the
form: why does God allow such a diversity of incompatible systems of belief
about Himself? This is aIIied to the more general question: why doesn't He make
at least the main outlines of the truth about these matters clear to everyone? And
both are simply particular versions of the familiar problem of evil. As with other
versions, there have been many attempts to deal with them. Then there are
social-psychological problems as to what factors lead to the particular forms
taken by religious belief, organization and practice in the various world religions.
And so on.
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Turning to epistemic difficulties, I have been arguing only that the facts of religious pluralism do not establish that it is irrational for one to engage in CP and
other religious experiential practices. But I have not denied that religious pluralism
should diminish the confidence one has in the reliability of CP. On the contrary. I
think we can see that there is a negative influence here just by asking ourselves
whether we would not be entitled to repose more confidence in CP if all religious
persons formed M-beliefs in the CP way, than we are in the present situation. If
all those who take themselves to be experientially aware of God's presence in their
lives were to tell stories that agree with each other in broad outline, wouldn't we be
more certain that we are in cognitive contact with God in CP than we are in fact? I
think this cannot be denied. An epistemic as well as a theological load would be
lifted from our shoulders. Thus, I would acknowledge that it is right and proper for
one to be worried and perplexed by religious pluralism, epistemically as well as
theologically, though not to the extent of denying the rationality of CP.
This conclusion is, admittedly, very imprecise. One's justification for engaging
in CP is diminished by religious pluralism, but not to the extent of its being irrational
for one to engage in that practice. But just what is the order of magnitude of this
diminution from "ideal justification"? How far is the resulting degree of justification from each of the extremes of full justification and complete lack of justification? I don't see any basis for answering such questions. I don't see any basis for
quantifying degrees of justification , in any event. I will have to content myself with
saying that the degree of justification that remains is such as to make it not irrational
for one to engage in the belief forming practice and to hold the beliefs so formed.
The facts of religious diversity do not suffice to override the positive considerations
on the other side (the presumptive reliability of any socially established DP, plus
the internal self-support involved) to such an extent as to show that the practice
lacks a degree of reliability appropriate to rational acceptance. We are warranted
in supposing CP to be a reasonably reliable mode of belief formation, one that at
least gives us approximations to the truth about God and our relations thereto that
suffice for our condition.
I do not take the practical implication of this conclusion to be that the Christian,
or the member of another religious community, is free to shut herself up within the
boundaries of her own community and ignore the rest of the world. On the contrary.
The knowledgeable and reflective Christian should be concerned about the situation, both theologically and epistemically. Actuated by the latter concern, she
should do whatever seems feasible to search for common ground on which to adjudicate the crucial differences between the world religions, seeking a way to show
in a non-circular way which of the contenders is correct. What success will attend
these efforts I do not presume to predict. Perhaps it is only in God's good time that
a more thorough insight into the truth behind these divergent perspectives will
be revealed to us.
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NOTES

I. Of course there would still be serious theological, apologetic, and evangelical problems posed
by the persistence of incompatible faiths.

2. The use of the term 'practice' is not intended to carry any implication that this activity is under
voluntary control. To avoid such a suggestion, terms like 'process', 'disposition', or 'habit', could
be used as alternatives.
3. It will not have escaped the reader's notice that this account owes much both to Reid and to
Wittgenstein, though in spirit it is closer to the former. As will become clear in the sequel, I do not
accept Wittgenstein's verificationist, non-realist assumptions that we cannot so much as sensibly
attempt to evaluate a practice, or the beliefs generated therein, from the outside, or that different
practices involve different concepts of truth and reality.
4. I omit consideration of the complication that a belief might be determined by an unreliable
input-output function that is involved in a mostly reliable doxastic practice.
5. At this point the reader may well wonder just what epistemic status r take this "general picture"
to have. Is it based on the pooled experience (or the pooled M-beliefs) of the community throughout
its history? Is it based on divine revelation, and if so are we thinking of this revelation as communicated
otherwise than through the formation of M-beliefs from particularly crucial individual experiential
encounters with God? Do innate tendencies playa role? And what about natural theology? These
are all crucial questions for the epistemology of religious belief, but I will have to forego consideration
of them at this time.
6. This is controversial. Traditional appeals to miracles, history, and natural theology have been
used to do just that. But I shall take it that none of this suffices to give strong enough support to a
'
claim to reliability.
7. CP is no more independent of other DP's than is SP and other secular practices. For one thing,
reasoning of various sorts, as well as sense perception and memory, are used in building up the
general system of doctrine that provides the overrider system and the scheme in terms of which God
is identified and characterized.
8. See my "Religious Experience and Religious Belief', Nous, 16 (1982), pp. 03-12; "Christian
Experience and Christian Belief', in Faith and Ratiooolity, ed. A. Plantinga & N. Wolterstorff (U.
of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 103-134; "Perceiving God" ,Journ. Philos., 83 (1986), pp. 655-66.
9. To be sure, as I am depicting the situation, the outputs of each religious DP are in fundamental
contradiction to the outputs of other religious DP's. Nevertheless, since r will also be taking it that
none of these DP's are more "firmly established" than the others, these incompatibilities do not
serve to discredit any of them.
10. See Fred Dretske's distinction between the "incremental" knowledge provided by a particular
case of visual perception, and the "proto-knowledge" that is brought to that perception, in Chapter
III of his Seeing and Knowing (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969).
11. To be sure, we can consider a more rudimentary perceptual belief forming practice in which
the beliefs formed on the basis of experience are much less specific than those that are formulated
in terms of the conceptual and doctrinal scheme of a particular religion. Such a practice could be
defended without getting into the defence of the basic belief system of any religion. And, indeed,
if the beliefs involved are unspecific enough they may be confronted by no opposition from other
religions. This is the tack taken by Gary Gutting in his Religious Belief and Religious Skepticism
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(U. of Notre Dame Press, 1982). In Chapter V he argues that religious experience can justify a
"core" belief in the existence of a very good and very powerful being, but that it cannot justify the
more distinctive beliefs of any particular religion. Since I take it that belief formation on the basis
of experience in religion always takes place in terms of the conceptual and doctrinal system of some
particular religion, I do not feel that what Gutting defends is actually realized in human affairs, and
therefore I shall not consider it further.
12. Whether one has it much more nearly straight than all the others, or whether some or all have
it straight to varying degrees, or. indeed to the same degree, is a question we would need other
resources to answer.
13. William Hasker puts forward an example of this sort in his "On Justifying the Christian Practice",
The New Scholasticism, L, no. 2, Spring, 1986.
14. One might think that there is a predictive test in terms of the success of the therapies based on
the respective methodologies. But, alas, parallel methodological controversy will break out over the
assessment of therapeutic success. I am also assuming that psychoanalytic theories do not have
implications that have been disconfirmed by ordinary empirical investigation; or if there have been
such, the theories have been modified to take account of them without losing their distinctive thrust.
15. Many questions would have to be settled if we were to pursue these fantasies. For example,
does the environment look different to the people in these different cultures, or is it only that they
use a different conceptual scheme to form perceptual beliefs about what they are seeing? I think that
the former alternative will be more suitable for present purposes.

